Constitutional and Human Rights Dimensions of Capital Punishment in Nigeria

Abstract

The retention of the death penalty in Nigeria presents a persistent tension between constitutional authorisation and evolving international human rights standards on the right to life. While section 33(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) permits the deprivation of life pursuant to a judicial sentence, this article argues that the provision has been widely misinterpreted as an endorsement rather than a narrowly framed exception. The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative research methodology. Doctrinally, it interrogates the constitutional, statutory, and institutional foundations of capital punishment in Nigeria. Comparatively, it evaluates Nigeria's legal position against international human rights instruments, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and highlights the growing normative shift toward abolition. The article demonstrates that Nigeria’s current position reflects a disjunction between formal legality and substantive legitimacy. It contends that the constitutional basis of the death penalty is doctrinally fragile and increasingly incompatible with contemporary human rights standards,. Drawing on comparative jurisprudence, the article identifies viable pathways for reconciling domestic law with international obligations through judicial reinterpretation, legislative reform, and institutional change. It concludes that the continued retention of the death penalty in Nigeria is not only normatively indefensible but also legally unsustainable within an evolving human rights framework, and that the space for maintaining the status quo is rapidly diminishing.